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How Are Migrant Employees Managed? An Integrated Analysis 
 
Abstract 
I integrate theories of acculturation, statistical discrimination and social distance with social 
identity theory to propose a comprehensive theoretical framework that accounts for the 
differential managerial treatment of social groups. I develop and apply this framework to study 
the extent to which migrant employees are managed differently than native employees are and to 
unpack differentials in managerial treatment between specific migrant groups. Hallmark of the 
framework is that it considers group membership as well as traits of the social group to which an 
employee belongs and the fluidity of group boundaries. I predict that migrants receive different 
managerial treatment than natives do but that this difference diminishes with acculturation. I 
further predict that the level of economic development of migrants’ home country and home-host 
country (dis)similarities explain differentials in managerial treatment between migrant groups. In 
a sample comprising up to 13,628 migrants from more than 160 home countries and focusing on 
job autonomy as a key feature of how employees are managed or supervised, I find strong 
empirical support for these predictions. This paper helps understand the mechanisms and factors 
that bias employers to make suboptimal use of human capital resources drawn from a cross-





The way in which an employee is managed or supervised is a most basic feature of his/her work 
experience. Moreover, differential managerial treatment of individuals based on membership of 
social groups, i.e., discrimination, has important consequences, signaling that organizations make 
suboptimal use of available human capital resources and contributing to social inequality as well 
as making employers liable to lawsuits (Arrow, 1972; Wright, Ferris, Hiller & Kroll, 1995; Lee, 
Pitesa, Thau, & Pillutla, 2015). Nevertheless, the extensive literature on workforce diversity and 
workplace inclusion (Cox, 1994; Milliken & Martins, 1996; Williams, & O’Reilly, 1998; Brief, 
2008; Shore et al., 2009; Mor Barak, 2013) has not generated much insight on the quintessential 
question of whether and to what extent organizations manage their employees differentially 
based on membership of social groups. Past work has revealed race-related differentials in 
workplace support and sponsorship (Greenhaus, Parasuraman, & Wormley, 1990; James, 2000). 
Similarly, there have been many studies of group differences in post-hiring employee outcomes, 
not least performance evaluations (Kraiger & Ford, 1985; Roberson, Galvin, & Charles, 2007; 
Pearce & Xu, 2012). Typically, however, this body of research shies away from considering 
concrete managerial practices as they are applied to different social groups in society. In 
addition, considered social groups tend to be narrowly focused on gender and black/white 
dichotomies, neglecting massive migratory trends and radical shifts in the birth-country 
composition of workforces worldwide (Castles, de Haas, & Miller, 2014; Lillie, Çaro, Berntsen, 
& Wagner, 2014). In the US, for instance, the foreign-born population has increased from 5.4% 
to 12.9% in the last 50 years and the percentage of European migrants decreased from 75% to 
12% in favor of migrants from Asia and Latin America (Grieco et al., 2012) (see Population 
Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations, 2013 and 
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OECD, 2015 for data on similar trends elsewhere). Still, though, we simply know very little 
about how and why individuals with different national-cultural backgrounds may be subject to 
different managerial practices. 
To fill this gap, in this paper I develop an integrated theoretical framework of the differential 
managerial treatment of social groups. The theoretical perspective with most obvious relevance 
to my analysis is social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) (or social identity-based 
faultlines theory [Lau & Murnighan, 1998]), which I complement with ideas from acculturation 
theory (Berry, 1997). Moreover, to move beyond narrowly defined, dichotomous group 
memberships (men versus women, blacks versus whites), I add insights from theories of 
statistical discrimination (Arrow, 1972; Aigner & Cain, 1977) and social distance (Bogardus, 
1925; Karakayali, 2009), which allow me to make a more fine-grained distinction between social 
groups. Key feature of the resulting framework is that it considers the role of group membership 
but also the role of aggregate-level traits of the group to which an employee belongs and the 
fluidity of group boundaries or faultlines. Specifically, following social identity theory, I predict 
that group membership—belonging to the employer’s ingroup or not—is a key determinant of 
the managerial treatment that an employee receives. However, my extension is to add a role for 
acculturation (adapting to and adopting traits from the employer’s ingroup), which works to 
make the initial ingroup/outgroup boundary more diffuse and diminish the effect of outgroup 
membership on managerial treatment. Moreover, incorporation of statistical discrimination and 
social distance theories enables me to unpack the sources of differentials in managerial treatment 
between a large number of distinct social groups. 
As indicated, the main motivation for developing this integrated framework of differential 
managerial treatment of social groups is to use it to analyze and present systematic empirical 
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evidence on the managerial treatment of migrants vis-à-vis natives and of various migrant groups 
in society, specifically groups of migrants born in different home countries. In the empirical part 
of my analysis, I focus on one specific managerial practice, namely the amount of job autonomy 
that an employee has. The reason for this focus is that job autonomy is a key feature of how 
employees are managed (Turner & Lawrence, 1965; Breaugh, 1985) and plays a prominent role 
in studies of, for instance, employee motivation (Spector, 1986; Gagné & Deci, 2005), self-
managing teams (Kirkman & Rosen, 1999; Langfred, 2004), and job quality (Green, 2006; 
Gallie, 2007). The data that I use are collected as part of the European Social Survey or ESS, 
which has the important advantage that my empirical findings have high ecological validity and 
real-life significance.1 The specific sample that I am able to consider comprises up to 13,628 
individual migrants and 151,834 individuals in total, living in 32 mostly European host or 
destination countries. Most distinctively, the migrants in this sample originate from more than 
160 home countries and typically comprise more than 1,250 home-host country dyads. The 
results of my empirical analysis confirm the relationships and differentials predicted by the 
theoretical framework. On average, migrant employees have less job autonomy than native 
employees have, but acculturation, specifically increased time spent in the host country, 
correlates positively with the amount of job autonomy that a migrant employee has. Considering 
differentials between various groups of migrants defined by their home country, both home-
                                                 
1
 On the other hand, a disadvantage of using data on real-life outcomes of migrants and natives is 
that, compared to a laboratory setting, there are more confounding influences. However, in my 
empirical analysis, I include an extensive set of control variables to address possible biases due 
to such confounders. 
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country level of economic development and home-host country distance or (dis)similarities, 
notably shared language, are found to explain part of the variation in job autonomy between 
these groups. I conclude that the evidence supports my proposed theoretical framework and that, 
when it comes to diversity of national-cultural backgrounds, workplace inclusion is far from 
completed. My findings are relevant both for managerial practice, as differentiation based on 
social group membership is bound to lead to suboptimal use of available human capital 
resources, and for society at large, as social inequality appears to extend beyond traditional labor 
market outcomes (Arrow, 1972; Aigner & Cain, 1977; Pager & Shepherd, 2008; Lang & 
Lehmann, 2012; Lee et al., 2015) all the way to what people experience at their place of work. 
This paper makes two key contributions. First, I present the first-ever, cross-national 
quantitative evidence on the managerial treatment of migrants and specific groups of migrants. 
On the waves of growing workforce diversity, much time and effort has been devoted to studying 
the causes and consequences of workplace diversity (Cox, 1994; Milliken & Martins, 1996; 
Williams, & O’Reilly, 1998; Brief, 2008; Shore et al., 2009; Mor Barak, 2013). However, this 
literature has been largely silent on the role of group membership in shaping the way in which an 
individual is managed. This paper fills this gap, presenting rich empirical evidence for a uniquely 
culturally diverse cross-national sample. Second, this paper provides comprehensive 
understanding of differentials in managerial treatment between social groups. The existing 
literature on workforce diversity and workplace inclusion is dominated by classic theories 
emphasizing group dichotomies (Allport, 1954; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). My theoretical 
framework, as well as the empirical evidence supporting it, in contrast, show the importance of a 
variety of other factors and mechanisms not considered in an integrated manner in the extant 
literature. When it comes to workplace discrimination, the idea of social group dichotomies 
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should only be a starting point and valuable lessons can be learned by those researchers and 
practitioners that take a more comprehensive perspective and consider such influences as group-
level traits and intergroup (dis)similarities as factors shaping employers’ decisions of how to 
manage (some of) their employees. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
In this section, I develop my theoretical framework. In four subsections, I draw on a variety of 
theories and derive four propositions on how social group membership affects the managerial 
treatment that an employee receives. The subsections progress from a relative coarse 
understanding of the effect of dichotomous social group membership on the way an employee is 
managed in the first subsection to a more detailed unpacking of the factors and mechanisms 
underlying differentials in managerial treatment of a large number of distinct social groups in 
later subsections. In each of the four subsections, I also formulate hypotheses that apply the 
theoretical framework to study the managerial treatment of migrants vis-à-vis natives and of 
different migrants groups. Table 1 provides a summary of this section in terms of predicted 
relationships, which are subject of empirical testing later on. 
 
<< Insert Table 1 about here >> 
 
 
Social Categorization, Ingroup/Outgroup Membership, and Managerial Treatment 
The main theoretical backdrop to my integrated analysis of differentials in managerial treatment 
is social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The hallmark of this theory is the idea that 
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individuals classify themselves and others into different social groups or categories on the basis 
of certain salient individual characteristics (Fiske, 2000; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). A 
typical group classification is to distinguish between an “ingroup” and an “outgroup,” where the 
distinction is based on similarity between the individual and other individuals on some easily 
observable characteristic(s). The effect of social group membership on managerial treatment 
derives from the fact that people tend to perceive and interact with ingroup and outgroup 
members differently, including generic ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979; Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). Such intergroup biases, in turn, find 
organizational expression in, for instance, selection decisions (Lee et al., 2015) but also the 
assigning of employees to pleasurable versus unpleasurable job tasks, the allocation of overtime, 
et cetera. Overall, I propose the following effect of social group membership, specifically 
ingroup/outgroup membership, on managerial treatment (P1): 
 
Proposition 1. Employees that do not belong to their employer’s ingroup are managed differently 
than employees belonging to this ingroup are. 
 
As stated, the empirical application of the theoretical framework that I develop in this paper 
concerns migrant and native employees and focuses on job autonomy as a key feature of the way 
in which an employee is managed. Starting with P1, I thus translate all my propositions into 
hypotheses that have variation in job autonomy as the dependent variable or phenomenon to be 
explained. In much the same fashion, for my empirical analysis, I follow the standard, intergroup 
approach to migrant discrimination applied by (social) psychologists, which involves classifying 
natives as ingroup members and migrants as outgroup members (e.g., Lee & Fiske, 2006; Dietz, 
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2010). This approach also fits the large literature finding that national identity and ethnicity (or 
national-cultural background more broadly) are common criteria for group membership (Barth, 
1969; Fiske, 2000; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). 
Following the argument underlying P1 concerning group membership and differential 
managerial treatment in general, I expect that employers typically have a less favorable attitude 
towards and opinion of migrant employees compared to native employees, ceteris paribus. And 
that, as such, employers are less willing to grant autonomy to migrant employees than to native 
employees. I further expect ingroup/outgroup trust differentials to play a role, as granting an 
employee autonomy means that the employer relinquishes some of his/her power to monitor and 
coerce the employee into acting in the employer’s best interest (Langfred, 2004; Bloom, Sadun, 
& Van Reenen, 2012; Van Hoorn, 2013, 2014b). As it turns out, trust research indeed finds that 
people put much more trust into individuals belonging to the ingroup than into individuals 
belonging to the outgroup (Fukuyama, 1995; Delhey, Newton, & Welzel, 2011; Van Hoorn, 
2014a), providing further reason to expect that employers grant less autonomy to migrant 
employees than they do to native employees. In summary, I propose the following relationship 
between an employee’s migrant status and the amount of job autonomy that he/she has (H1): 
 




Acculturation and the Fluidity of Social Group Boundaries 
While the distinction between ingroup and outgroup members provides a useful starting point for 
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thinking about the effect of group membership on managerial treatment, this coarse dichotomy 
does not do justice to the (employee-level) heterogeneity that can be observed within these two 
groups. A generic concern is that individuals tend to belong to multiple social groups at the same 
time, always ending up in somebody’s ingroup and someone else’s outgroup (Stangor, Lynch, 
Duan, & Glas, 1992; Crisp & Hewstone, 2007). A more specific concern is that we can 
understand the role of group membership in managerial treatment better if the ingroup/outgroup 
distinction is seen as a continuum rather than a strict dichotomy. Social or group boundaries, not 
least those associated with ethnicity or national-cultural background, are not set in stone but fluid 
(Omi & Winant, 1994; Saperstein & Penner, 2012). Hence, individual employees may exhibit 
varying degrees of belonging to either their employer’s ingroup or their employer’s outgroup. 
Exactly what degree of belonging to the ingroup a prototypical outgroup member exhibits or 
is able to achieve depends on a range of factors. A concept that seems particularly relevant to this 
issue is acculturation (Berry, 1980, 1997). Acculturation refers to the process of cultural change 
that occurs when individuals from different cultural groups come into continuous contact with 
one another (Redfield, Linton, & Herskovits, 1935, pp. 145-6). Strictly speaking, acculturation is 
a bidirectional process involving changes to the culture of both groups involved. In practice, 
however, most acculturation research focuses on unidirectional effects concerning minority 
groups, particularly migrants, adapting to and adopting traits from the majority or socially 
dominant group in society. A key dependent variable in this literature subsequently is how well 
migrants (or other such minority groups) adapt to the culture of the dominant social group in 
their host country. Similarly, an important consequence of acculturation is that, by adapting to 
become more similar to the members of the other group, the initial boundary between an 
individual belonging to the minority group and the individuals belonging to the majority group 
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becomes increasingly fluid. In fact, the most extreme form of being acculturated into another 
social group is that there is no longer any discernable basis for classifying a person as belonging 
to this social group instead of his/her original social group.2 
Returning to the classic ingroup/outgroup dichotomy, I conclude that the degree of belonging 
to the ingroup or not (cf. P1) likely varies with acculturation. Accordingly, I find that the more 
acculturated into the ingroup an outgroup member is, the more he/she will be treated as an 
ingroup member rather than as an outgroup member. Hence, my second proposition (P2), which 
reflects the idea that acculturation makes the initial ingroup/outgroup boundary more diffuse and 
diminishes the effect of outgroup membership on managerial treatment: 
 
Proposition 2. The difference in managerial treatment between ingroup and outgroup members 
is smaller for outgroup members that are more acculturated into their employer’s ingroup. 
 
As before, I complete this subsection by translating the formulated proposition into a testable 
hypothesis using acculturation as the explanatory variable while retaining variation in job 
autonomy as the phenomenon to be explained. I thereby focus on the temporal dimension of 
acculturation—a process of reaching a certain degree of similarity with the ingroup that unfolds 
over time (cf. Redfield et al., 1935). The reason is that the temporal dimension of acculturation 
                                                 
2
 Whether achieving such a level of acculturation is feasible is, of course, another story. Personal 
values, beliefs, norms, rituals, language, et cetera might all be adapted to the other group to a 




matches earlier empirical work considering the effect of experience or time spent in the host 
country on migrant (labor market) outcomes (see Chiswick, 1978 for an early study). 
Emphasizing this temporal dimension of acculturation, I find that the native-migrant, ingroup-
outgroup distinction loses salience with the amount of time that a migrant employee has spent in 
the host country. Hence, I expect that migrants that have been living in the host country longer 
are treated more similar to native employees than migrants lacking this experience are and 
therefore have more job autonomy than migrants lacking this experience have. My second 
hypothesis (H2) thus reads as follows: 
 




Group-Level Traits and Differential Managerial Treatment 
So far, my analysis has emphasized ingroup/outgroup membership as a key driver of differentials 
in managerial treatment between social groups, only allowing for employee heterogeneity 
associated with acculturation into the ingroup. In the remainder of this section, however, I want 
to dig deeper and work on unpacking differentials between multiple social groups. 
Some of the earliest theoretical work on discrimination emphasized the distinction between 
so-called taste-based and statistical discrimination (Arrow, 1972; Aigner & Cain, 1977). The 
former type of discrimination is purely affect-based, meaning that, for whatever reason, an 
individual (or group of individuals) has a strong dislike of individuals deemed to belong to a 
particular social group (e.g., “hate for men/women”). Statistical discrimination, on the other 
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hand, has a cognitive basis, as it involves making rational inferences about an individual on the 
basis of observable (average) traits of the group to which this individual belongs (e.g., “you are a 
man/woman and therefore you (do not) have great upper body strength”).3 
Importantly, both types of discrimination—taste-based or statistical—fit the classic 
ingroup/outgroup paradigm (Allport, 1954; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). However, a distinction is that 
statistical discrimination affects managerial treatment irrespective of the ingroup/outgroup 
dichotomy and corresponding ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation. Indeed, an employee 
does not need to belong to the employer’s outgroup to be judged and treated differentially on the 
basis of some group-level trait: a man and a woman may be managed differentially even when 
both belong to the employer’s ingroup. Moreover, statistical discrimination theories emphasize 
observable group traits as the basis for employee-level inferences and subsequent differential 
treatment and do not refer to negative stereotypes that do not have such an objective basis. On 
the other hand, some form of statistical discrimination is, of course, also often used either to 
classify individuals into different social categories—all individuals with great upper body 
strength and, therefore, all men are in the outgroup—or to make a more fine-grained distinction 
between the diverse set of outgroup members. 
My motivation for integrating statistical discrimination theories in my proposed framework 
actually derives from the latter application of statistical discrimination by employers. Drawing 
on statistical discrimination theories, I can dig beyond ingroup/outgroup differences in 
managerial treatment and unpack the factors biasing employers and leading to treatment 
                                                 
3
 To be sure, while an inference based on a group trait is typically rational, this rationality in and 
of itself does not mean that acting on the inference leads to an optimal decision. 
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differentials between a larger number of distinct social groups (> 2). Overall, I propose the 
following (P3): 
 
Proposition 3. Traits of a distinctive social group to which an employee belongs affect how the 
employee is managed. 
 
If anything, P3 provides the foundation for a large number of hypotheses. Notably, there are 
numerous group traits that employers might draw on to make inferences about an individual 
employee that, in turn, shape their decision on how much autonomy to grant to this employee. In 
addition, there are many different criteria that one can apply when classifying the diverse set of 
outgroup members into a larger number of distinct social groups (age, social class, sexual 
orientation, religion, et cetera). 
To start with the latter issue, I find that both the large literature on national stereotypes (Katz 
& Braly, 1933; Madon et al., 2001) as well as worldwide trends in the home-country 
composition of migrant populations (Castles, de Haas, & Miller, 2014; OECD, 2015) suggest 
that individuals’ home country provides an illuminating basis for subdividing the migrant 
outgroup in multiple distinct social groups (see also, for example, Lee & Fiske, 2006). 
Concerning the former issue, in contrast, even limiting attention to the set of home-country traits 
that prior research has identified as affecting migrant outcomes is bound to result in many more 
group-level explanatory variables than can be consired in one paper. However, among the home-
country traits found to affect migrant outcomes, the importance of home-country level of 
economic development seems to stand out (see Borjas, 1987 for an early study). Hence, I adopt 
home-country economic development as the explanatory variable in the empirical counterpart to 
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P3. Concretely, I thereby expect that, in the mind of employers deciding on how much autonomy 
to grant to an employee from a particular home country, a higher level of economic development 
is seen as a positive. The logic is that home-country economic development signals some 
positive qualities that an employer may wish to harness by offering a certain degree of discretion 
and right to self-management to the employee. Moreover, economic development is associated 
with strong social norms towards cooperation (Fukuyama, 1995), meaning that home-country 
economic development can be taken as a signal of an employee’s trustworthiness. My third 
hypothesis (H3) correspondingly reads: 
 
Hypothesis 3. Migrant employees born in home countries that are more economically developed 




While acculturation is expected to have a significant effect on the nature and extent of the 
ingroup/outgroup dichotomy, the idea of varying degrees of belonging and not belonging to a 
particular social group fits a larger literature on the social distance that can exist between two 
individuals (or two groups of individuals) (Bogardus, 1925; Karakayali, 2009). An early, formal 
definition of social distance is as “the grades and degrees of understanding and intimacy which 
characterize personal and social relations generally” (Park, 1924, p. 339). Practically, the concept 
of social distance concerns interpersonal (dis)similarities in such domains as personal values, 
beliefs, dialect, religiosity and/or social class (Karakayali, 2009). These (dis)similarities, in turn, 
can be salient characteristics for social categorization and the classifying of another individual as 
14 
 
belonging to one’s ingroup or not. Moreover, the smaller the social distance between two groups, 
the more favorable attitude they have towards one another (Akerlof, 1997; Brewer, 1999; 
Karakayali, 2009). Accordingly, I conclude that social distance affects managerial treatment in 
much the same way as group membership in general, and belonging to the ingroup in particular, 
does (see above). Specifically, I have the following proposition (P4) on social distance between 
the employee’s social group and the employer’s ingroup and managerial treatment: 
 
Proposition 4. The average social distance between a particular social group and their 
employer’s ingroup affects how employees belonging to this social group are managed. 
 
In translating P4 into a testable hypothesis, a challenge is again that, as mentioned, the 
number of ways in which a particular social group can be socially close or distant to another 
group is enormous (Karakayali, 2009). Also in this case, however, I can draw on extant work to 
identify some relevant forms of social distance to consider in my empirical analysis. 
Following the previous subsection, I take the subdivision of the migrant outgroup into distinct 
social groups on the basis of a migrant’s home country as a starting point. As it turns out, I also 
need to distinguish between different ingroups faced by the migrant employees in my sample, 
lest my analysis ends up conflating effects due to intergroup distance with effects due to 
underlying group traits (Van Hoorn & Maseland, 2014, 2015). As I already consider home 
countries in my analysis, I find that the most appropriate criterion for subdividing the native 
ingroup in my analysis into multiple social groups is on the basis of country of residence, i.e., on 
the basis of host country. Concretely, my empirical analysis thus considers social distance as it 
exists between the dyad formed by a migrant’s home country and his/her host country. 
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Home-host country dyads are widely studied, particularly in international management, which 
emphasizes the effect of home-host country distance or (dis)similarities on the behavior and 
performance of multinational enterprises (see Eden & Miller, 2004 for a survey). From an initial 
focus on so-called psychic and cultural distance (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Kogut & Singh, 
1988), the distance literature in international management has gradually broadened the scope of 
dyadic distance measures studied to include a variety of dimensions on which two countries can 
be more or less similar to one another (e.g., Ghemawat, 2001; Dow & Karunaratna, 2006). The 
theoretical rationale for the proposed effects of distance on multinational enterprises typically 
involve such mechanisms as intercountry dissimilarities hampering the flow of information, 
providing a basis for discrimination against nondomestic firms, and leading to a general lack of 
social ties in the host country (e.g., Zaheer, 1995). 
For the case of managerial treatment of migrant groups, I expect that similar mechanisms are 
at play. However, I do not expect that all forms of home-host distance considered in the 
international management literature are equally relevant determinants of managerial treatment. 
From the many dimensions of intercountry distance suggested by Ghemawat (2001) and Dow 
and Karunaratna (2006), I thus select two of the most relevant forms of distance to consider in 
my empirical analysis. These two forms of home-host country distance are language, specifically 
shared official language between the migrant’s home country and his/her host country, and the 
existence of past colonial ties between the migrant’s home country and his/her host country. The 
reason that I deem these particular forms of dyadic distance relevant is that I think that they 
affect how individuals belonging to one group feel about individuals belonging to the other 
group and vice versa. Shared language facilitates communication and allows people to 
understand each other better than when communication is more difficult. Similarly, the existence 
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of past colonial ties signals that individuals from the two countries are aware of each other and 
have familiarized themselves with each other and the other country for a longer time already. 
Hence, I expect that both shared language and past colonial ties reflect smaller social distance 
between two countries. Smaller social distance, in turn, likely leads employers to grant more job 
autonomy to the particular employee, as per some of the arguments concerning trust and ingroup 
favoritism and outgroup derogation introduced earlier. At the same time, though, I think there 
can be a second channel through which common language and past colonial ties end up having a 
positive effect on job autonomy. For this channel, which does not necessarily involve decreased 
social distance, the argument is that shared language and colonial ties correlate positively with 
migrants’ job autonomy because migrants sharing these features with their host countries are less 
hampered by barriers to the flow of valuable information and better acquainted with the host-
country social, economic and institutional environment. This knowledge advantage, in turn, 
would make them more effective and reliable employees compared to migrants speaking another 
language and lacking past ties with their host country. Overall, I have the following set of twin 
hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 4a. Migrant employees have more job autonomy if they are born in home countries 
that have the same official language as the host country has. 
Hypothesis 4b. Migrant employees have more job autonomy if they are born in home countries 
that have past colonial ties with the host country. 
 
 
MATERIALS AND METHOD 
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Sample and Data Sources 
My main data source is the bi-annual European Social Survey or ESS (Jowell & Central Co-
ordinating Team, 2007).4 The ESS has collected answers on a variety of questionnaire items for 
nationally representative samples from 32, mostly European countries. Following the approach 
used in various other studies (e.g., Alesina & Giuliano, 2011; Luttmer & Singhal, 2011), I use 
the questionnaire item that asks respondents whether they are born in their country of residence 
to distinguish between natives and migrants in the ESS data. Similarly, if the answer to this 
question is no, I use the follow-up question that asks in which country the respondent is born to 
obtain information on migrants’ home country. In six waves (2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010 & 
2012), the ESS has collected data for more than 250,000 individuals, both migrants and natives. 
Excluding respondents with missing data on some of my (control) variables (see below) leaves a 
main sample of 151,834 individuals, 13,628 out of which are migrants. When considering 
differences in job autonomy between migrants from different home countries the sample is 
reduced to about 12,500 migrant employees. The 32 countries originally covered by the ESS are 
the host countries in my analysis and all estimations include controls for host-country fixed 
effects.5 The migrants in my sample cover more than 160 home countries and form more than 
                                                 
4
 For a complete description of the ESS and the questionnaire items included in this survey, see 
http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org.  
5
 These host countries are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Croatia, 
Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 




1,250 unique home-host country dyads, depending on the specific variables considered. 
Importantly, my sample meets all the criteria for an analysis that is able to separate effects that 
are specific to a home-host dyad, i.e., home-host (dis)similarities, from effects that are specific to 
the home and/or host countr(y)(ies) involved (Van Hoorn & Maseland, 2014, 2015). To save 
space, I do no present the full list of home countries in my analysis. For the same reason, I 
present only some descriptive statistics (Tables A.1 and A.2 in the appendix) and no correlations 
between the variables in my analysis. Note, though, that I have checked and that 
multicollinearity is never a concern. Further details on my sample and complete descriptive 
statistics are available on request. 
To test my first and second hypothesis, I rely strictly on ESS data. To test my other 
hypotheses, however, I supplement the ESS data with data for home-country variables and 
dyadic variables from a variety of sources. Data on countries’ level of economic development 
come from the World Bank World Development Indicators database (World Bank, 2015), while 
data on country dyads, specifically shared language and home-host country colonial ties come 
from the well-known CEPII distance database (Mayer & Zignago, 2011). All data used in this 
paper are publicly available. 
Although a large portion of my data are survey data that come from the same source, I do not 
expect common method bias to pose any problems. The reason is that, with the exception of my 
dependent variable, almost all of the items from the ESS that I use refer to objective phenomena 
that are recorded by the interviewer and do not ask respondents to make their own, subjective 
                                                                                                                                                             
fixed effects allows me to control for country-level factors such as cultural norms that affect how 
migrants are treated in a particular country (cf. Gelfand, Nishii, Raver, & Schneider, 2005). 
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assessment. To err on the safe side, I also did a formal check using Harman’s single factor test, 
but, as expected, this test did not identify a general factor driving variation in my variables. 
 
Variables 
Dependent Variable. The dependent variable in my analysis is job autonomy, specifically the 
amount of autonomy that an employer grants to an employee, as experienced by the employee. 
Job autonomy is measured using a questionnaire item that asks respondents “how much the 
management at your work allows/allowed you to decide how your own daily work is/was 
organised?,” where answers can be given on Likert-type scale that ranges from 0, “I have/had no 
influence” to 10, “I have/had complete control.” This item is a variation on the classic item 
concerning job autonomy pioneered by Hackman and Oldham (1975) and widely used since. 
Applications of the ESS data in general and the job autonomy item and data in particular run 
similarly widely, increasingly also in management (Gooderham, Nordhaug, & Ringdal, 2006; 
Muethel, Hoegl, & Parboteeah, 2011; Van Hoorn, 2015b). Although there is much work showing 
that job autonomy indicators such as the one that I use are valid, original evidence on the 
construct validity of the ESS item is available on request. Because the ESS introduced a slight 
change in wording of the job autonomy item between the first wave in 2002 and later waves—
from referring only to the present tense (“allows” and “is”) to referring to the past tense 
(“allowed” and “was”) as well—I add dummies for the year/wave of the survey in all analyses, 
this way getting rid of any year/wave-specific measurement error. To ease interpretation of the 
results and following the standard set by past work, I analyze the job autonomy indicator as a 
cardinal variable. However, as one of my robustness checks, I also assess whether my results are 
sensitive to this assumption. 
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A possible drawback of using the job autonomy indicator as the dependent variable is that this 
indicator is based on a single item, making it prone to measurement error. Such measurement 
error, in turn, will not bias my estimates but could make them less precise. To deal with this 
issue, I have also constructed a two-item index of so-called job influence that combines the 
above job autonomy item with a survey item asking respondents how much the management at 
their work allows/allowed them to influence policy decisions about the activities of the 
organization. Consistent with other work (Van Hoorn, 2015b), I find that combining this item on 
decision influence with the original job autonomy item renders a reliable index of job influence 
(Cronbach alpha = .793). I use the two-item index of job influence to check the robustness of the 
results that I obtain using the single-item job autonomy indicator as the dependent variable. 
 
Main Independent Variables. My first main independent variable is the dummy variable that I 
use to distinguish between natives (0) and migrants (1). I use this variable to test H1 concerning 
the differential managerial treatment of migrant employees vis-à-vis native employees. Later on, 
when focusing on differences in managerial treatment between various groups of migrants, I use 
this variable to limit my sample to consider migrants only. 
For my second hypothesis, I assess the role of acculturation, which I consider by looking at 
time spent in the host country. In Waves 1-4, the ESS included a survey item asking respondents 
“how long ago did you first come to live in [country]?,” pre-specifying some possible answers, 
for example, “6-10 years ago” or “More than 20 years ago.” In Waves 5-6, the relevant survey 
item was rephrased to ask: “What year did you first come to live in [country]?” To make the 
answers to these two survey items compatible, I create three dummy variables corresponding to 
three “types” of migrants: (i) migrants that have spent between 0 and 5 years in the host country; 
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(ii) migrants that have spent between 6 and 10 years in the host country; and (iii) migrants that 
have spent more than 10 years in the host country. My acculturation hypothesis (H2) predicts 
that these three types of migrants have different levels of job autonomy. 
For H3 concerning the effect of migrants’ home country, specifically the home country’s level 
of economic development, on the amount of job autonomy that a migrant employee has, I 
consider these countries’ average level of income per capita. I calculate country means of the 
per-capita gross domestic product (GDP) measured in US dollars and with purchasing power 
parity for the years 2004-2013, as available from the World Bank World Development Indicators 
database (World Bank, 2015). 
Finally, for H4a and H4b concerning dyad-specific effects on the amount of job autonomy 
that certain groups of migrant employees have, I consider two dummy variables. The first 
dummy variable concerns shared language and has a score of 1 if the migrants’ home country 
and the host country share the same official language and a score of 0 otherwise. The second 
dummy variable concerns colonial ties between the migrant’s home country and the host country 
and has a score of 1 if there have been colonial ties between the home and the host country and a 
score of 0 otherwise (Mayer & Zignago, 2011). 
 
Control Variables. In addition, to my main independent variables, I consider a variety of 
(individual-level) control variables. In general, there is a concern for an omitted variable bias in 
my analysis. The migrant dummy—but variables concerning a migrant’s home country or a 
specific home-host dyad as well—may correlate with or proxy for some unobserved variable that 
has a direct effect on the amount of job autonomy that an employer grants to an employee, 
regardless of whether the employee is a migrant or not or regardless of specific features of a 
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migrant’s home country or the specific home-host dyad to which the migrant employee belongs.  
As stated, in all my empirical, models I control for both year and host-country fixed effects. 
Other factors that I control for are standard demographic characteristics (age, age squared, and 
gender), employment status (e.g., in paid work, unemployed & looking for job, unemployed & 
not looking for job, in education, retired), and total hours worked, which proxies both for the 
type of job one has and an employee’s willingness to perform paid work. Meanwhile, some of 
the most likely confounders have to do with level of education and I control for differences in 
education using two variables simultaneously. First, I control for the number of years of full-time 
education that a respondent has completed. Second, I control for respondents’ level of education. 
The ESS records the highest level of education that a respondent has using the European Survey 
version of the ISCED (International Standard Classification of Education) and I recode this 
categorical variable in a group of seven dummies and one reference category. Some of the 
categories discerned are “less than lower secondary” and “lower secondary” all the way up to 
“lower tertiary education, BA level” and “higher tertiary education.” 
To rule out that migrants are, for some (non-discriminatory) reason, self-selected into jobs 
characterized by distinctive amounts of autonomy, I further control for the nature of the 
employment relation (employee, self-employed, or working for own family business) and 
specific features of the industry in which a respondent works. For the latter, I construct two 
industry-level control variables based on averages calculated across all the respondents working 
in a certain industry. The first industry average that I consider is the mean amount of job 
autonomy in the industry, which provides a direct way of controlling for the influence that an 
employee’s industry has on his/her job autonomy. The second industry average that I consider is 
the percentage of total employees in an industry that is non-native. By including this variable I 
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can control for possible effects of access to migrant networks that may be more present in some 
industries than in others (cf. Ibarra, 1995; Seibert, Kraimer, & Liden, 2001) as well as for 
industry-specific features of organizations’ external environment that might affect the managerial 
treatment of migrant employees (cf. Gelfand, Nishii, Raver, & Schneider, 2005). 
Notwithstanding this extensive set of control variables, there might still be some factor, not 
yet considered by me, that leads employers to grant less autonomy to migrants in general or to 
specific migrant groups. Notably, in line with theories of statistical discrimination (Arrow, 1972; 
Aigner & Cain, 1977), it is possible that migrant status proxies for a lack of certain unobserved 
traits or skills that would be taken into account by any employer deciding on how much 
autonomy to grant to a specific employee, regardless of group membership or social distance and 
the like. The fact that I take into account such relevant factors as education and number of hours 
worked makes this scenario relatively unlikely. Nevertheless, I cannot rule out this possibility in 
my analysis in principle. Hence, as powerful test of the robustness of my baseline results 
obtained using the set of standard control variable described above, I repeat my baseline analyses 
but add a control for personal income. The rationale is that the income of an employee is a good 
proxy for the value that an employer attaches to the work done by this employee, as when more 
productive employees, on average, earn more than less productive employees do. The ESS asks 
respondents about their household’s total net income and classifies the answer on either a 12-
point scale (Waves 1-3) or a 10-point scale (Waves 4-6). To increase the intertemporal and cross-
country comparability of measured income, I follow Van Hoorn (2015a) and construct a measure 
of rank income, specifically the percentile score of a respondents’ recorded income relative to 
the recorded income of other respondents from the same country and surveyed in the same year. 
A final control variable that I consider as a robustness check is meant to deal with possible 
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response biases. The concern is that some respondents, particularly respondents from certain 
cultural backgrounds, are overly positive or overly negative when asked to provide a subjective 
assessment of their experiences. The implication is that some respondents may understate or 
overstate their job autonomy, which could lead to biased estimates. I control for such 
positive/negative response style in a most straightforward fashion, which is to include a measure 
of self-reported happiness. Of all possible subjective assessments, self-reported happiness seems 
most sensitive to positive/negative response style, meaning that adding self-reported happiness 
allows me to control for respondents’ tendency to be overly positive or negative when assessing 
their lives in a most direct manner. The specific measure that I use derives from the survey item 
asking respondents “taking all things together, how happy would you say you are?,” where 
possible answers can range from 0, “extremely unhappy” to 10, “extremely happy.” 
To conclude, let me state explicitly that quite a few of my control variables are bound to be 
affected by some of the same processes that affect how migrant employees and employees 
belonging to different migrant groups are managed, not least the income that an employee earns.6 
Hence, one can argue that controlling for all the above-mentioned factors actually means 
throwing away the baby with the bathwater. Nevertheless, I consider these variables to limit 
potential biases due to omitted variables, even though this means that some of my estimated 
coefficients are probably best seen as lower bounds. 
                                                 
6
 Indeed, in addition to the initial hiring decision, wage differentials among different social 
groups are probably the most studied outcome variable in the large cross-disciplinary literature 
on labor market discrimination and workforce diversity (see Pager & Shepherd, 2008 and Lang 





Testing my hypotheses requires estimating different models. For H1, I use the complete sample 
(n=151,834) and estimate a model that allows me to compare the average amount of job 
autonomy that migrant employees have with the average amount of job autonomy that native 
employees have. This model reads as follows: 
 
 ii2i10i εXβMββA +++= ,        (1) 
 
where Ai denotes the amount of job autonomy that employee i has, Mi is a dummy variable 
indicating whether an individual is a migrant (1) or not (0), Xi is a set of control variables (host-
country fixed effects, year/wave fixed effects, age, gender, et cetera) and εi is a random error 
term. The relevant coefficient is β1 and H1 is confirmed if this coefficient is statistically 
significantly negative. 
For my other hypotheses, I consider a sample comprising only migrants, where the exact size 
of the sample varies with the specific explanatory variables considered. The complete model that 
I use but modify to suit specific tests is as follows: 
 
 idmi4id3im2idm10idm εXβDβEβTββA +++++= ,     (2) 
 
where Aidm denotes the amount of job autonomy of employee i who is nested in home-host dyad 
d and has home country m, Xi denotes a set of control variables (host-country fixed effects, 
year/wave fixed effects, age, gender, et cetera) and εidm is a random term. Tidm further denotes the 
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time that migrant i has spent in the host country, while Eim denotes the level of economic 
development of the home country of migrant i. Similarly, Did refers to properties of the home-
host country dyad in which migrant i is nested, specifically shared official language and colonial 
ties. Confirmation of H2 requires that coefficient β1 is statistically significantly positive, while 
confirmation of H3 requires that coefficient β2 is statistically significantly positive. Similarly, 
confirmation of either H4a or H4b requires that coefficient β3 is statistically significantly 
positive. 
To estimate the above models, I use OLS. However, when it comes to testing the effects of 
migrants’ home country or effects specific to a home-host country dyad, my data take on a 
hierarchical structure with individual observations nested in higher-order units of analysis, either 
home countries or home-host country dyads. Since such hierarchical clustering of observations 
can introduce biases, I use cluster-corrected standard errors when estimating the model depicted 
in Eq. 2. Moreover, in case multiway clustering occurs and I need to choose between possible 
levels at which to cluster my standard errors, specifically home countries versus home-host 
country dyads, I always select the home-country level, as this is the highest level in the analysis 
(Cameron, Gelbach, & Miller, 2011). Similarly, when assessing the sensitivity of my results to 
the assumed cardinality of the job autonomy indicator, I use left- and right-censored tobit 
estimation and, particularly, ordered probit estimation instead of OLS. I estimate all coefficients 




I start my empirical analysis providing basic tests for my hypotheses. Models 1-3 in Table 2 
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present results for my first hypothesis (H1) that migrant employees have less job autonomy than 
native employees have. Results confirm this hypothesis, as they indicate a strong negative effect 
of being a migrant vis-à-vis a native on job autonomy (Model 1). Adding control variables such 
as years of education changes the estimated coefficient for being a migrant a bit but not much 
(Models 2 and 3). The migrant-native gap is sizeable, equal to about half a point on the 0-10 job 
autonomy scale. Moreover, the gap is more than two and a halve times larger than the gender 
gap. Similarly, to compensate for being born in another country, migrant employees would need 
more than one standard deviation of additional years of education to achieve the same amount of 
job autonomy that an otherwise comparable native employee has, which is equal to roughly four 
years of fulltime education. 
 
<< Insert Table 2 about here >> 
 
Considering the role of acculturation (H2), results suggest that the job autonomy of a migrant 
employee increases with time spent in the host country, confirming my second hypothesis (Table 
2, Models 4-6). The biggest difference in job autonomy occurs between migrants that have spent 
more than 10 years in the host country versus migrants that have spent 10 years or less in the 
host country. The difference in job autonomy between migrants that have spent between 0 and 5 
years and between 6 and 10 years in the host country (the reference category), in contrast, is 
smaller and not typically statistically significant at usual levels (p > .1). The positive effect of 
acculturation on job autonomy is comparable in size to the effect of a one standard deviation 
increase in total years of education. Meanwhile, compared to the overall native-migrant 
autonomy gap (Model 3 in Table 2), the job autonomy difference between the three types of 
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migrants is also sizeable. However, migrants that have spent 10 years or less in the host country 
still have less job autonomy than the average native employee has, ceteris paribus (see Table A.3 
in the appendix for detailed results on the native-migrant autonomy gap for selected samples of 
migrants). 
 
<< Insert Table 3 about here >> 
 
H3 predicts that migrants from different home countries have different levels of job autonomy 
on the count of the level of economic development of their home countries. Results (Model 7 in 
Table 3) confirm this prediction. Home-country level of economic development appears to play a 
role in how much job autonomy a migrant employee has and the size of this effect is comparable 
to, though somewhat smaller than, the effect of years of education. Interestingly, it is possible 
that there is no autonomy gap between migrants from economically very advanced countries and 
the average native employee. That is, the autonomy gap that exists between the average migrant 
employee and the average native employee (Model 3 in Table 2) could vanish if we consider 
only non-average migrants born in a very limited set of high-income home countries (again see 
Table A.3 in the appendix for detailed results on the native-migrant autonomy gap for selected 
samples of migrants). 
My final, twin set of hypotheses (H4a & H4b) concerns effects on migrants’ job autonomy 
that derive from the specific dyad formed by the migrant’s home and host country. Results 
suggest that there are indeed effects on the amount of job autonomy that a migrant employee has 
that are due to features of the home-host dyad to which a migrant belongs (Models 8-10 in Table 
3). Both shared language and past colonial ties between the home and the host country of the 
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migrant are associated with higher levels of job autonomy for the employee. However, the effect 
of colonial ties becomes small and statistically insignificant at usual levels (p > .1) when shared 
language is taken into account (Model 10). At almost 0.13, the positive effect of shared language 
remains about equally large, however. Meanwhile, as with acculturation, migrants that speak the 
language of their host country still have less job autonomy than the average native employee has 
(Table A.3 in the appendix again presents detailed results on the native-migrant autonomy gap 
for selected samples of migrants). 
 
Robustness Checks 
Omitted variable bias. A main objection against the above results is that they suffer an omitted 
variable bias. Particularly, as discussed in the previous section, the migrant-native dichotomy, as 
well as traits of migrants’ home country and home-host country dyadic distance, could proxy for 
an unobserved variable, notably employee quality, that is a valid and useful criterion for 
employers to use to inform the decision of how much job autonomy to grant to an employee (cf. 
Arrow, 1972; Aigner & Cain, 1977). My extensive use of control variables such as education 
level, years of education and hours worked goes a long way to address this bias. However, as an 
even stricter test of my hypotheses, I repeat the above analyses controlling for employees’ 
income. Income differs from objective variables such as education in that it captures the value of 
the employee to an employer, meaning that the income earned by an employee is a good proxy 
for the presence or absence of specific qualities of the employee that are of value to the 
employer. Hence, if an omitted variable concerning employee quality is biasing my results, this 
variable should correlate strongly with income, so that controlling for income effectively 




<< Insert Table 4 about here >> 
 
Table 4 presents the results. In all cases, income, specifically income rank, correlates strongly 
positively with job autonomy, which is consistent with the above argument for income as a 
suitable proxy for unobserved employee qualities. More importantly, all my results are robust to 
controlling for income (cf. Tables 2 and 3). The only noticeable difference is that, compared to 
my baseline analysis, coefficients for the key independent variables are slightly smaller than 
before. Meanwhile, a model that includes all key independent variables simultaneously (while 
also controlling for income) renders results similar to results obtained when testing each 
hypothesis separately (Tables 2 and 3 and Models 11-14 in Table 4), but with lower coefficients 
(Model 15 in Table 4). 
 
Alternative dependent variable. As a second robustness check, I consider whether my results are 
sensitive to the specific indicator that I use to operationalize how an employee is managed. As 
elaborated in the previous section, as an alternative to the single-item job autonomy indicator, I 
use a two-item index measuring the amount of influence that an employee has in his/her job. 
Results (Table 5) are highly similar to my baseline results. Effect sizes, as captured by 
standardized coefficients, can be slightly smaller when considering job influence than when job 
considering autonomy. Still, though, results are robust and do not appear to be driven by the 
specific indicator that I use to measure how an employee is managed. 
 





Controlling for possible biases due to positive/negative response style. As a third robustness 
check, I consider the possibility that systematic (culture-based) differences in response style, 
particularly overly positive or negative self-assessments, bias my results. To do so, I control for 
respondents’ self-reported happiness, which is a subjective assessment that respondents make of 
their lives as a whole and is therefore most prone to positive/negative response style influences. 
Results (Table 6) are highly similar to my baseline results, indicating that positive/negative 
response style is unlikely to play a large role in my analysis. 
 
<< Insert Table 6 about here >> 
 
 
Alternatives to OLS estimation. As a final robustness check, I repeat my baseline analyses but 
using estimation methods that explicitly deal with the fact that the job autonomy indicator is, 
strictly speaking, not a cardinal variable even though it is treated as such by my use of OLS 
estimation. As we would expect, results (Table 7) using these different estimation methods are 
highly comparable to and confirm my baseline results. Hence, my initial estimates do not seem 
biased on the count of using OLS. 
 






Are migrant employees managed differently than native employees with similar characteristics 
and qualifications are and, if so, on what basis? Concerning the first question, I find strong 
evidence indicating that migrant employees are managed differently than native employees are. 
Drawing on social identity theory, I expected that being foreign-born versus native-born is an 
important criterion for social categorization and subsequent differential managerial treatment and 
this prediction is borne out by the data. Importantly, the observed migrant-native job autonomy 
gap is robust to controlling for a range of other variables that might distinguish the average 
migrant employee from the average native employee, particularly differences in education level. 
In fact, a sizeable difference in the managerial treatment of migrants and natives remains when 
taking into account native-migrant income differentials, the most prominent concern in the cross-
disciplinary literature on labor market discrimination and workforce diversity (Pager & 
Shepherd, 2008; Lang & Lehmann, 2012). Hence, the evidence overwhelmingly supports my 
first hypothesis that migrant employees have less job autonomy than comparable native 
employees do. 
Digging deeper in the migrant-native gap in managerial treatment, specifically the amount of 
job autonomy that an employee has, results indicate an important effect of acculturation. The 
more time a migrant has spent in his/her host country, the more job autonomy he/she has. 
Moreover, this effect is again robust to controlling for various factors, including the income that 
an employee earns. 
Concerning the second question, I have sought to unpack differentials in managerial treatment 
between specific groups of migrants, where I defined group membership using country of birth 
or home country as the classification criterion. Drawing on theories of statistical discrimination, I 
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expected that features of migrants’ home countries, specifically level of economic development, 
would provide a basis for differential managerial treatment. Results confirm this expectation, 
indicating a robust relationship between the level of economic development of a migrants’ home 
country and the amount of job autonomy that a migrant has in his/her host country. Similarly, I 
used social distance theory to hypothesize that features of the dyad formed by a migrant’s home 
country and his/her host country, specifically shared language and past colonial ties, affect how 
the migrant is managed. Results largely confirm this hypothesis, except for the effect of home-
host country colonial ties on migrant employees’ job autonomy, which is not typically 
statistically significant at usual levels (p > .1). 
Overall, my empirical analysis has revealed significant and robust differences in the amount 
of autonomy that different groups in society have at their jobs, particularly migrants vis-à-vis 
natives. Moreover, differences found are consistent with the various mechanisms identified in 
my theoretical framework of differential managerial treatment of social groups, including 
acculturation and statistical discrimination. Hence, the main finding of my empirical analysis is 
not only that my hypotheses receive widespread support but also that my theoretical framework 
indeed provides a valid description of how employers are led to differentiate between various 
social groups when deciding on how to manage their employees. The integration of various 
theoretical perspectives results in a comprehensive framework that offers much relevant insight 
for understanding employers’ biases and the suboptimal use of human capital resources and 
societal inequality that result from these biases. 
The general robustness as well as the managerial and societal relevance of this paper’s 
findings notwithstanding, there are also some limitations to the analysis presented in this paper. 
Some of the most prominent limitations are as follows. First, both my theorizing and subsequent 
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empirical analyses only consider mechanisms and factors that affect employers when deciding 
how much autonomy to grant to a specific employee and do not incorporate employee agency. 
While the power to grant autonomy ultimately resides with the employer and not the employee, 
there are actions that an employee can take in an attempt to secure a higher amount of job 
autonomy (should he/she desire so). Nevertheless, I do not think that my comparative neglect of 
employee agency has biased my results. Moreover, I want to keep my framework as simple as 
possible, seeking only to address the basic issue of an individual being managed differently than 
an otherwise comparable individual purely on the basis of group membership. I do think, 
however, that an interesting avenue for future research is to extend the theoretical framework 
developed in this paper to allow for employee agency. 
Second, my empirical analysis has operationalized differential managerial treatment in strictly 
quantitative terms, receiving more or less of something. In reality, however, differential 
treatment is probably not limited to quantitative differences and would find expression in 
qualitative differences as well. More generally, my analysis has focused on one specific 
managerial practice and should not be seen as providing exhaustive empirical evidence on all the 
diverse ways in which migrant and native employees can be managed differentially. Indeed, I 
welcome follow-up work that considers other forms of differential managerial treatment to 
complement the empirical evidence that I have presented here. Note, though, that the factors and 
mechanisms highlighted by my theoretical framework operate independently from the exact way 
in which differential managerial treatment finds real-life expression in individual employees’ 
workplace experience. 
Third, my evidence on the validity of the theoretical framework involves only migrants and 
natives and not social groups distinguished on the basis of characteristics other than an 
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employee’s country of birth. Indeed, a broader assessment of the validity of my theoretical 
framework would include a variety of social groups distinguished by such characteristics as age 
or academic pedigree and even subnational region or religiosity. Meanwhile, my empirical 
analysis of migrants and natives of course resonates with the large literature on the (labor 
market) discrimination of migrants (Pager & Shepherd, 2008; Lang & Lehmann, 2012) as well as 
massive changes in the size and home-country composition of the migrant proportion of 
workforces worldwide (Castles, de Haas, & Miller, 2014; OECD, 2015). 
Fourth, both my theorizing and subsequent empirical analyses have been internally focused 
and abstained from considering environmental influences that might affect how different groups 
are managed (Gelfand et al., 2005), except through control variables (e.g., host-country fixed 
effects). I would expect, however, that the influence of some of the factors and mechanisms that 
I have considered are conditioned by features of organizations’ external environment: the effect 
of a group trait like home-country economic development may be more critical to managerial 
treatment in some types of jobs than in others, for instance. Again, I do not think that my 
comparative neglect of the external environment has biased my results, as these results concern 
averages for the entire sample of jobs. Incorporating, for instance, features of task 
interdependency (Lee et al., 2015) would provide an interesting extension to my generic 
theoretical framework, however. 
Finally, my analysis does not yet consider the nexus between group-level traits, acculturation 
and social distance, particularly between the latter two. In my theoretical framework, I consider 
these concepts separately but they are highly interrelated. Group-level traits can form a basis for 
perceived social distance or interpersonal (dis)similarities, while acculturation can be seen as a 
waning of initial dissimilarities. Indeed, an interesting extension to the present analysis is to 
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consider how acculturation, specifically time spent in the host country, moderates the effect of, 
for instance, linguistic distance on managerial treatment. Given the scope of this paper, for now, 




This paper has presented a study of differentials in the way individual employees are managed 
based on the social group to which they belong. The issue of differential treatment on the basis of 
group membership, i.e., discrimination, has a long tradition in management research as well as in 
the social sciences at large. However, this literature is mostly concerned with discriminatory 
hiring and reward practices and not with differentials in the way members of various social 
groups are managed or supervised. Similarly, while many studies have considered group 
dichotomies based on gender or race, only scant attention has been paid to workforce diversity in 
the form of foreign-born employees from highly varied national-cultural backgrounds, which has 
been rapidly increasing in many countries worldwide. 
This paper advances the literature in several ways. The paper’s most basic contribution is the 
development of a comprehensive theoretical framework of the differential managerial treatment 
of social groups that integrates a variety of theories, including social identity and acculturation 
theory. Application of this framework to the situation faced by migrants from more than 160 
different birth countries subsequently rendered unique cross-national empirical evidence on how 
different groups in society are managed and the basis on which employers are biased to manage 
some employees differently than other employees. The practical relevance of the framework and 
these findings is twofold. First, my analysis helps decision makers get a better grasp of the 
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factors and mechanisms that bias them towards certain social groups in a way that leads to 
suboptimal use of human capital resources. Second, my paper generates new insight on a much-
neglected component of social inequality, which resides in the dissimilar work experiences and 
managerial practices that people from different social groups are subject to. Meanwhile, the 
relevance of the analysis presented in this paper could be broadened by shifting attention away 
from individuals to entire organizations. I have focused my theoretical framework and empirical 
evidence on individual outcomes. However, my analysis would also apply to entire 
organizations. In fact, positive and negative biases that are due to organizations’ home country 
and/or home-host country (dis)similarities play a prominent role in international management, 
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Table 1: Summary of Predicted Relationships 
Proposition Basis for differential 
managerial treatment Hypothesis 
Variable in empirical 
analysis 




employer’s ingroup or 
to another social group 
1 Employee is a migrant or 
not - 
2 
Differences in degree 
of acculturation into 
employer’s ingroup 
2 
Acculturation as measured 
by a migrant employee’s 




Traits of the social 
group to which the 
employee belongs 
3 
Level of economic 
development of a migrant 






and the outgroup to 
which the employee 
belongs 
4a 
The migrant employee’s 
home country has the same 
official language as the host 
country or not 
+ 
4b 
The migrant employee’s 
home country has past 
colonial ties with the host 






Table 2: Job Autonomy of Migrant Employees vis-à-vis Native Employees and the Role of Acculturation 
Dependent = Job autonomy    Only migrants Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 




(.008) - - - 
Migrant living in host country for 5 







Migrant living in host country for 6 
to 10 years (reference category) - - - 0 0 0 
Migrant living in host country for 




































Average job autonomy in 
individual’s industry - - 
.111*** 
(.002) - - 
.118*** 
(.008) 
Percentage migrant employees in 
individual’s industry - - 
.006** 
(.002) - - 
.032*** 
(.008) 
Dummies for employment relation No No Yes No No Yes 
Dummies for education level No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Dummies for employment status Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age and age squared Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Host-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year/wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 151,834 151,834 151,834 13,454 13,454 13,454 
No. of migrants 13,628 13,628 13,628 13,454 13,454 13,454 
R2 .1382 .1834 .2565 .1028 .1651 .2329 
Notes: All continuous measures (dependent and independent variables) are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation 
of 1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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Table 3: The Effects of Home-Country Economic Development and Home-Host Country 
Shared Language and Colonial Ties on Migrants’ Job Autonomy 
Dependent = Job autonomy Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Home-country level of 
economic development 
.095*** 
(.008) - - - 
Shared language between 





Colonial tie between home and 





Standard control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 12,833 12,792 12,792 12,792 
No. of home countries 168 173 173 173 
No. of home-host dyads 1,311 1,316 1,316 1,316 
Level of clustering of standard 
errors 
Home 
country Dyad Dyad Dyad 
R2 .2414 .2376 .2360 .2376 
Notes: All continuous measures (dependent and independent variables) are standardized to have 
a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Standard control variables are gender, hours worked 
per week, years of education, average job autonomy in individual’s industry, percentage migrant 
employees in individual’s industry, dummies for employment relation, dummies for education 
level, dummies for employment status, age and age squared, host-country dummies, and 
year/wave dummies (see Table 2). Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust standard errors that 
are clustered at the level indicated in the table. *, ** and *** denotes statistical significance at 




Table 4: Robustness Checks with Income Rank as an Added Control Variable 
Dependent = Job autonomy  Migrants only Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
Migrant (1=yes) -.122*** (.008) - - - - 
Migrant living in host country for 
5 or less years (1=yes) - 
-.041 
(.030) - - 
-.051 
(.035) 
Migrant living in host country for 
6 to 10 years (reference category) - 0 - - 0 
Migrant living in host country for 
more than 10 years (1=yes) - 
.100*** 
(.025) - - 
.076*** 
(.023) 
Home-country level of economic 





Shared language between home 





Colonial tie between home and 














Standard control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 151,834 13,454 12,833 12,792 12,559 
No. of migrants 13,628 13,454 12,833 12,792 12,559 
No. of home countries 193 186 168 173 163 
No. of home-host dyads 1,596 1,399 1,311 1,316 1,282 










R2 .2643 .2410 .2490 .2467 .2517 
Notes: All continuous measures (dependent and independent variables) are standardized to have 
a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Standard control variables are gender, hours worked 
per week, years of education, average job autonomy in individual’s industry, percentage migrant 
employees in individual’s industry, dummies for employment relation, dummies for education 
level, dummies for employment status, age and age squared, host-country dummies, and 
year/wave dummies (see Table 2). Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust standard errors that 
are clustered at the level indicated in the table, if applicable. *, ** and *** denotes statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
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Table 5: Results Using an Alternative Measure of How an Employee is Managed 
Dependent = Job influence index  Migrants only Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 
Migrant (1=yes) -.132** (.008) - - - - 
Migrant living in host country for 
5 or less years (1=yes) - 
-.045 
(.031) - - 
-.054 
(.034) 
Migrant living in host country for 
6 to 10 years (reference category) - 0 - - 0 
Migrant living in host country for 
more than 10 years (1=yes) - 
.119*** 
(.025) - - 
.090*** 
(.029) 
Home-country level of economic 





Shared language between home 





Colonial tie between home and 





Standard control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 139,499 12,127 11,825 11,770 11,561 
No. of migrants 12,490 12,127 11,825 11,770 11,561 
No. of home countries 192 185 167 172 162 
No. of home-host dyads 1,553 1,353 1,266 1,270 1,240 










R2 .3569 .3261 .3320 .3275 .3351 
Notes: All continuous measures (dependent and independent variables) are standardized to have 
a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Standard control variables are gender, hours worked 
per week, years of education, average job autonomy in individual’s industry, percentage migrant 
employees in individual’s industry, dummies for employment relation, dummies for education 
level, dummies for employment status, age and age squared, host-country dummies, and 
year/wave dummies (see Table 2). Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust standard errors that 
are clustered at the level indicated in the table, if applicable. *, ** and *** denotes statistical 




Table 6: Results with Negative or Positive Response Style Controlled for 
Dependent = Job autonomy  Migrants only Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 Model 25 
Migrant (1=yes) -.131*** (.008) - - - - 
Migrant living in host country for 
5 or less years (1=yes) - 
-.050* 
(.031) - - 
-.063* 
(.036) 
Migrant living in host country for 
6 to 10 years (reference category) - 0 - - 0 
Migrant living in host country for 
more than 10 years (1=yes) - 
.112*** 
(.025) - - 
.086*** 
(.025) 
Home-country level of economic 





Shared language between home 





Colonial tie between home and 














Standard control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 151,236 13,170 12,768 12,727 12,498 
No. of migrants 13,560 13,170 12,768 12,727 12,498 
No. of home countries 193 186 168 173 163 
No. of home-host dyads 1,596 1,397 1,309 1,314 1,280 










R2 .2645 .2406 .2483 .2455 .2513 
Notes: All continuous measures (dependent and independent variables) are standardized to have 
a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Standard control variables are gender, hours worked 
per week, years of education, average job autonomy in individual’s industry, percentage migrant 
employees in individual’s industry, dummies for employment relation, dummies for education 
level, dummies for employment status, age and age squared, host-country dummies, and 
year/wave dummies (see Table 2). Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust standard errors that 
are clustered at the level indicated in the table, if applicable. *, ** and *** denotes statistical 





Table 7: Robustness Checks with Alternative Estimation Methods 
Dependent = Job autonomy (0-
10) 
Tobit Ordered probit OLS estimates for comparison 
Model 26 Model 27 Model 28 Model 29 Model 30 Model 31 





Migrant living in host country for 







Migrant living in host country for 
6 to 10 years (reference category) - 0 - 0 - 0 
Migrant living in host country for 















Shared language between home 







Colonial tie between home and 







Standard control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 151,834 12,559 151,834 12,559 151,834 12,559 
No. of natives 138,206 0 138,206 0 138,206 0 
No. of migrants 13,628 12,559 13,628 12,559 13,628 12,559 
No. of home countries 193 163 193 163 193 163 
No. of home-host dyads 1,596 1,282 1,596 1,282 1,596 1,282 
Level of clustering of standard 
errors 
Not 
applicable Home country 
Not 
applicable Home country 
Not 
applicable Home country 











applicable .2565 .2446 
Notes: All continuous independent variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Standard control 
variables are gender, hours worked per week, years of education, average job autonomy in individual’s industry, percentage migrant 
employees in individual’s industry, dummies for employment relation, dummies for education level, dummies for employment status, 
age and age squared, host-country dummies, and year/wave dummies (see Table 2). Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust 
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standard errors that are clustered at the level indicated in the table, if applicable. *, ** and *** denotes statistical significance at the 









[n=13,628 unless otherwise 
indicated] 
Native employees 
[n=138,206 unless otherwise 
indicated] 
Complete sample 
[n=151,834 unless otherwise 
indicated] 























Total hours normally worked per 




































Table A.2: Selected Descriptive Statistics for Migrant Employees 
Variable Mean SD 
Migrant living in host country for 5 years or less (1=yes) [n=13,454] 12.4% 33.0% 
Migrant living in host country for 6 to 10 years (1=yes) [n=13,454] 12.0% 32.5% 
Migrant living in host country for more than 10 years (1=yes) [n=13,454] 75.6% 43.0% 
Home-country level of economic development in US$ purchasing power 
parity [n=12,833] 15,489 16,345 
Shared language between home and host country (1=yes) [n=12,792] 28.1% 44.9% 





Table A.3: The Native-Migrant Job Autonomy Gap for Selected Migrants 
Dependent = Job autonomy Acculturation 
Home-country economic 
development 
Shared language and/or past 
colonial ties 
Model A.1 Model A.2 Model A.3 Model A.4 Model A.5 Model A.6 
Migrant & living in host country 
for more than 10 years (1=yes) 
-.106*** 
(.010) - - - - - 
Migrant & living in host country 
for 5 years or less (1=yes) - 
-.259*** 
(.023) - - - - 
Migrant & host-country is high-
income (1=yes) - - 
-.037*** 
(.013) - - - 
Migrant & host-country is not 
high-income (1=yes) - - - 
-.190*** 
(.011) - - 
Migrant & either shared language 
or past colonial ties (1=yes) - - - - 
-.053*** 
(.013) - 
Migrant & neither shared language 
nor past colonial ties (1=yes) - - - - - 
-.191*** 
(.011) 
Standard control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 148,375 139,874 142,733 146,512 143,378 145,826 
No. of natives 138,206 138,206 138,206 138,206 138,206 138,206 
No. of migrants 10,169 1,668 4,527 8,306 5,172 7,620 
R2 .2570 .2597 .2597 .2575 .2581 .2591 
Notes: The cutoff point for high-income, economically advanced home country is set at an average per-capita income level of $12,736 
(purchasing power parity), which is the World Bank’s current cutoff point for high-income countries. The dependent variable is 
standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Standard control variables are gender, hours worked per week, years of 
education, average job autonomy in individual’s industry, percentage foreign-born employees in individual’s industry, dummies for 
employment relation, dummies for educational degree, dummies for employment status, age and age squared, host-country dummies, 
and year/wave dummies (see Table 2). Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust standard errors. *, ** and *** denotes statistical 
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